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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Douglas Arthur Liles appeals from the district court's order revoking his
probation. On appeal, he argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied his due process
rights when it denied his motion to augment the record, and that the district court
abused its sentencing discretion.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Liles with felony driving under the influence. (R., pp.25-26.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Liles pleaded guilty. (R., pp.30-39; 11/12/2010 Tr., p.5,
Ls.17-23.) The district court entered judgment and imposed a sentence of ten years
with two years fixed, but retained jurisdiction.

(R., ppA4-46.)

After the period of

retained jurisdiction, the district court placed Liles on probation for a period of eight
years. (R., pp.52-57.)
Within a few months, the state alleged that Liles violated his probation by (1)
consuming alcohol; (2) becoming involved in romantic relationships without the approval
of his probation officer or treatment provider; (3) driving in disregard of the district
court's order suspending his driving privileges; (4) being arrested for driving without
privileges; and (5) failing to inform his probation officer within 24 hours of his arrest. (R.,
pp.72-74.) Pursuant to an agreement, Liles admitted the first three violations, and the
state dismissed the remaining two. (See 12/2/2011 Tr., p.3, L.24 - pA, L.8; p.6, L.14 p.12, LA.)

The district court revoked Liles' probation and sua sponte reduced his

sentence to eight years with two fixed.

(R., pp.82-85.)

Liles filed a timely notice of

appeal from the district court's order revoking his probation (R., pp.87-89.)
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Pending appeal, Liles filed a motion to augment the settled record with
transcripts from the December 2, 2012 probation admit/deny hearing and the June 17,
2011 jurisdictional review hearing. (Motion To Augment And To Suspend The Briefing
Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof (hereinafter "Motion To Augment"), filed
July 3, 2012.) The state did not object to the preparation and inclusion of the transcript
from the admit/deny hearing, but objected to Liles' motion to prepare and include a
transcript from the jurisdictional review hearing.

(Objection In Part To "Motion To

Augment And To Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof,"
filed July 10,2012.) The Idaho Supreme Court granted Liles' motion for the transcript of
the admit/deny hearing but denied his request for the jurisdictional review transcript.
(Order To Augment The Record (In Part) And Suspend The Briefing Schedule
(hereinafter "Order Denying Motion To Augment"), filed July 16,2012.)
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ISSUES
Liles states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Liles due process and equal
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested
transcript?
2.
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Liles'
probation?
3.
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to further
reduce Mr. Liles' sentence sua sponte upon revoking probation?
(Appellant's brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Liles failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his
constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate record with an
irrelevant transcript?
2.
Has Liles failed to establish that the district court abused its sentencing discretion
either by revoking his probation or by not sua sponte further reducing his sentence?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Liles' Claim That His Due Process Or Equal Protection Rights Were Violated ByThe
Denial Of His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With An Irrelevant Transcript
Lacks Merit
A.

Introd uction
After the appellate record was settled, Liles filed a motion to augment the record

with the as-yet unprepared transcripts of the December 2, 2012 probation admit/deny
hearing and the June 17, 2011 jurisdictional review hearing. (Motion To Augment.) The
Idaho Supreme Court granted Liles' motion as it related to the admit/deny hearing
transcript but denied his motion as it related to the jurisdictional review transcript.
(Order Denying Motion To Augment.)
Liles now contends that, by denying his motion to augment the appellate record
with the requested jurisdictional review transcript, the Idaho Supreme Court violated his
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and denied him effective
assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, ppA-17.) Liles' argument is without
merit. First, if this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, Liles has failed to provide
any basis for the Court to reconsider the Idaho Supreme Court's order denying his
motion. Alternatively, on the merits, due process and equal protection require the state
only to provide a record sufficient for appellate review of the errors alleged. Because
the denied transcript is not relevant to, much less necessary for, appellate review of the
district court's order revoking Liles' probation (the only issue over which this Court has
jurisdiction), Liles has failed to show any error in the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of
his motion to augment.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one of

deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of
whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State
v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375,380,79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135
Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).

C.

If This Case Is Assigned To The Idaho Court Of Appeals, Liles Has Failed To
Provide Any Basis For The Court To Reconsider The Idaho Supreme Court's
Order Denying His Motion To Augment
In State v. Morgan, Docket No. 39057, 2012 Op. No. 38 (Ct. App. July 10, 2012),

the Idaho Court of Appeals considered a claim that the Idaho Supreme Court denied the
appellant his constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the record on
appeal with various transcripts.

In doing so, the Court "disclaim[ed] any authority to

review, and, in effect, reverse an Idaho Supreme Court decision made on a motion
made prior to assignment of the case to [the Idaho Court of Appeals] on the ground that
the Supreme Court decision was contrary to the state or federal constitutions or other
law." Morgan at 3. Such an undertaking, the Court explained, "would be tantamount to
the Court of Appeals entertaining an 'appeal' from an Idaho Supreme Court decision
and is plainly beyond the purview of this Court."

kL.

The Court, however, "deem[ed] it

within [its] authority ... to evaluate and rule on [a] renewed motion" if, for example, "the
completed appellant's brief and/or respondent's briefs have refined, clarified or
expanded issues on appeal in such a way as to demonstrate the need for additional
records or transcripts, or where new evidence is presented to support a renewed
motion."

kL.

To the extent this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, Liles'
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arguments fail to provide any basis for the Court to reconsider the Idaho Supreme
Court's order denying his motion to augment the record with a transcript that is
unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal.

D.

In The Alternative. Liles Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To
The Requested Augmentation
Even if this Court considers the merits of Liles' claim, all of his arguments fail. As

in Morgan, Liles argues that he is entitled to the additional transcript because, he
claims, the failure to provide it is a violation of his constitutional rights to due process,
equal protection, and the effective assistance of appellate counsel. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.4-17.) This is not "new information or justification for [Liles'] motion to augment the
record." See Morgan at 3. Even if it were, his arguments still lack merit.
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is sufficient
for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the proceedings below."
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 (2002) (citations omitted). The
state, however, "will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide
transcripts or other items that "will not be germane to consideration of the appeaL"
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 495 (1963); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S.
102,112 n.5 (1996) ("an indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial
record that are germane to consideration of the appeal") (internal citations omitted). To
demonstrate that the record is not sufficient, the defendant must show that any
omissions from the record prejudiced his ability to pursue the appeal. State v. Polson,
92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968). To show prejudice, Liles "must
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present something more than gross speculation that the transcripts were requisite to a
fair appeaL" Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2002).
Liles' appeal is timely only from the district court's January 4, 2012 order
revoking his probation. (See R., p.87 (appeal filed on January 5, 2012).) Liles argues
that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal protection by denying
his motion to augment the appellate record with the as-yet unprepared transcript from
the June 17, 2011 jurisdictional review hearing (Appellant's brief, ppA-17), but he has
failed to explain, much less demonstrate, how the transcript of that hearing is necessary
to decide the only issue over which this Court has jurisdiction on this appeal. There is
no indication that the court relied upon anything said at that previous hearing as a basis
for its decision to revoke his probation. Because the as-yet unprepared transcript was
never presented to the district court in relation to the revocation of Liles' probation, it
was never part of the record before the district court and is not properly considered for
the first time on appeal. See State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972,
974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993) (in rendering a decision on the issues raised on appeal, the
appellate court is "limited to review of the record made below" and "will not consider
new evidence that was never before the trial court"); see also Huerta v. Huerta, 127
Idaho 77, 80, 896 P.2d 985, 988 (Ct. App. 1995) ("It is not the role of this Court to
entertain new allegations of fact and consider new evidence."). Liles has failed to show
how the requested transcripts are relevant to any issue raised on appeal.
Liles relies on the Court of Appeals' statement from State v. Hanington, 148
Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009), that appellate "review [of] a sentence that is
ordered into execution following a period of probation" is based "upon the facts existing
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when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original
sentencing and the revocation of probation." (Appellant's brief, p.12-13.) According to
Liles, this language from Hanington requires augmentation with transcripts of all
hearings from sentencing to the revocation of his probation. (Appellant's brief, pp.1214.) The Court in Morgan, however, held that this interpretation of Hanington is too
broad.

Morgan at 4.

The Court clarified that although it "will not arbitrarily confine

[itself] to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the time of the revocation of
probation ... that does not mean that all proceedings in the trial court up to and
including sentencing are germane."

lsL

(emphasis original).

Rather, the Court will

simply consider the portions of the record before the trial court which are relevant to the
ultimate issue on appeal, in this case, the revocation of Liles' probation.

lsL

Liles also relies on State v. Warren, 123 Idaho 20,843 P.2d 170 (Ct. App. 1992),
as "[f]urther support" for his position.

(Appellant's brief, pp.13-14.) Liles' reliance on

Warren is misplaced. Warren was placed on probation following an aggravated battery
conviction. Warren, 123 Idaho at 21, 843 P.2d at 171. Two years later, Warren was
charged with a new crime and his probation was revoked in his aggravated battery
case, but his sentence was reduced.
motion, which was denied.

lsL

lsL

Despite the reduction, Warren filed a Rule 35

On appeal, Warren challenged the denial of his Rule 35

motion in the aggravated battery case. In addressing this claim, the Court of Appeals
noted the absence of either a presentence report or a transcript from the sentencing
hearing in the aggravated battery case and concluded that "[w]ithout a more complete
record and no argument by Warren as to why the sentence was unreasonable," there
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was no support for Warren's claim that the district court abused its discretion in relation
to the sentence reduction or the denial of Rule 35 relief.

kL

Liles argues that Warren supports his position that he is entitled to the requested
transcripts because the lack of them "functions as a procedural bar to the review of Mr.
Liles' appellate sentencing claims on the merits."

(Appellant's brief, p.14.)

This

argument reflects either a misrepresentation or a misunderstanding of Warren as the
Court in Warren clearly addressed the sentencing claim before it, but affirmed due to
the lack of a "more complete record" or "argument by Warren as to why the sentence
was unreasonable." Warren, 123 Idaho at 21, 843 P.2d at 171. Liles also claims "the
Warren opinion indicates that [the lack of transcripts] would be presumed to support the

district court's decision to execute the original sentence."

(Appellant's brief, p.14.)

However, nothing in Warren suggests that the absence of irrelevant transcripts would
be presumed to support the district court's opinion in this case.
Citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), Liles also claims that if he
can make a "colorable argument" that he needs "items" to complete a record, the state
must "prove that the requested items are not necessary for the appeal." (Appellant's
brief, p.9.) Mayer does not support this argument. Mayer was convicted on non-felony
charges punishable only by a fine and he appealed, challenging the sufficiency of
evidence and asserting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct.

kL

at 190. The appellate

court denied his request for a trial transcript at government expense on the basis of a
local rule providing that verbatim transcripts of trial proceedings would be provided at
government expense only for felonies.

kL at

191-93. The issue was not whether Mayer

was entitled to a record of his trial, but whether he was entitled to a verbatim transcript
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of his trial.

kL

at 193. The Court noted it had addressed a similar issue in Draper v.

Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), where the Court held that the government need not
provide transcripts that were not "germane to consideration of the appeal, and a State
will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such circumstances." Mayer,
404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper, 372 U.S. at 495-96).

However, "the State must

provide a full verbatim record where that is necessary to assure the indigent as effective
an appeal as would be available to the defendant with resources to pay his own way."

kL.

at 195.

"Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a

colorable need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a
portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on those
grounds."

kL

Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must establish
that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal.

kL at

194. Only after

the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is established and a
colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant will the burden shift to
the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some record other than a verbatim
transcript will be adequate.

kL

at 194-95. See also Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S.

226, 227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether a requested record is necessary, the Court
should consider the "value of the transcript to the defendant in connection with the
appeal," but the standard does not require "a showing of need tailored to the facts of the
particular case" and the Court may take notice of the importance of a transcript).
Liles' appeal is timely only from the district court's order revoking his probation.
The record related to that order is complete.
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Liles has failed to establish that the

requested transcript is necessary to create an adequate appellate record to review the
court's order. Nothing in the record suggests that the transcript Liles requested in his
augmentation was relied upon by the district court in relation to the revocation of Liles'
probation. Because Liles failed to make a showing of germaneness and colorable need
for the requested transcript, there is no burden on the state.

Because all of the

evidence before the district court is in the appellate record, that record is adequate for
appellate review, and Liles has failed to establish a violation of his due process rights. 1
See Strand, 137 Idaho at 463,50 P.3d at 478.
Liles also argues that the denial of his request to augment the record on appeal
with an irrelevant transcript denied him equal protection. The Court in Morgan rejected
the argument that equal protection mandates augmentation of all transcripts the
appellant desires, stating:
Morgan was not denied the transcripts because of indigency. Morgan was
afforded the opportunity to designate not only the standard clerk's record,
but also additional records necessary for inclusion in the clerk's record on
appeal. He had time to review the record and make any objections,
corrections, additions, or deletions prior to settling of the record, pursuant
to I.A.R. 29(a). Morgan's failure to fully and timely utilize the Idaho
Appellate Rules, and his failure to demonstrate the need for the transcripts
in his motion to augment the record, precluded him from including the first
probation violation hearing transcripts, not his indigency. Morgan's motion
to augment failed to make a showing that any appellant, indigent or
otherwise, would be entitled to the record as requested.
Morgan at 5. Liles' equal protection claim fails for the same reasons.
1 As a component of his due process claim, Liles also argues that the denial of his
motion to augment the record with the requested transcript has deprived him of effective
assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-17.) Because Liles has failed
to show that the requested transcript is necessary, or even relevant, for appellate review
of the district court's order revoking his probation, there is no possibility that the denial
of the motion to augment has deprived Liles of effective assistance of counsel on this
appeal.
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While Liles acknowledges that Morgan "does directly deal with the issues raised
in this appeal," he argues, "at this point this case is not finaL" (Appellant's brief, p.12.)
Although Morgan is not yet final, it is nevertheless persuasive authority that Liles' claims
lack merit.
Liles is entitled to a record adequate for appellate review of the district court's
order revoking his probation and nothing more.

He has failed to show that the

requested transcript is relevant to appellate review, much less necessary for adequate
appellate review. Having failed to make any such showing, his motion to augment the
record with an irrelevant transcript that was not relied upon by the district court is
properly denied.

Having failed to show his due process and equal protection rights

were implicated, much less violated, by that denial, Liles has failed to show any basis
for relief.

II.
Liles Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Liles asserts that the district court abused its sentencing discretion either by

revoking his probation or by not sua sponte further reducing his sentence upon revoking
probation. (Appellant's brief, pp.17-22.) Liles has failed to establish an abuse of the
district court's discretion.
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B.

Standard Of Review
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Moore,

131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499,
873 P.2d 144 (1994)).

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion By Revoking Liles'
Probation
After finding that Liles violated his probation by consuming alcohol, becoming

involved in relationships without the permission of his probation officer or treatment
provider, and driving after his license was suspended by the district court, the court
revoked Liles' probation. (R., pp.82-85.) On appeal, Liles argues that the district court
abused its discretion by revoking his probation. (Appellant's brief, pp.17-19.) Liles has
failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
"Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court." I.C. § 19-2601 (4).
The decision to revoke probation is also within the court's discretion. State v. Sanchez,
149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citing State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378,
381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)). In reviewing a district court's decision to
revoke probation, this Court employs a two-step analysis. Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105,
233 P.3d at 36 (citation omitted).
actually violated his probation.

kL

First, the Court considers whether the defendant
"If it is determined that the defendant has in fact

violated the terms of his probation, the second question is what should be the
consequences of that violation."

kL

A district court's decision to revoke probation is a

discretionary one that will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that
discretion. Id.
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Liles was not a model probationer. He was placed on probation in June, 2011.
(R., pp.53-57.) Among the terms of his probation were that he not "purchase, possess
or consume any alcoholic beverage" and a clear warning that
[t]he defendant has had his driving privileges suspended or restricted by
the terms of this order or by prior orders and is advised that in the event
defendant should admit to or be found guilty of driving without privileges,
that the defendant will be considered to have violated a fundamental
condition of probation.
(R., pp.54-55.) Nevertheless, within a few months of being placed on probation, Liles
violated that probation by consuming alcohol, getting involved in romantic relationships
without the approval of his probation officer or treatment provider, and driving in
disregard of the court's order.

(R., pp.73, 82-85; 12/2/2011 Tr., p.6, L.14 - p.8, L.8;

p.11, L.8-p.12, L.4.)
"Given all that," and an additional misdemeanor driving without privileges that
was still pending, the district court concluded that it did not "have the confidence that if
[it] returned [Liles] to the community [he] would be a successful probationer."
(12/30/2011 Tr., p.8, Ls.18-20.) Upon finding that Liles was unlikely to succeed under
supervision in the community, the district court properly exercised its discretion and
revoked Liles' probation.

(12/30/2011 Tr., p.8, Ls.18-25.)

Aspirations to complete

college, which Liles asserts may prevent him violating the terms of his probation in the
future (Appellant's brief, pp.18-19), simply do not establish an abuse of the district
court's discretion, especially where those aspirations were present both when he
committed his underlying offense and when he violated his probation. Liles has failed to
establish an abuse of the district court's discretion.
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D.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Not, Sua Sponte, Further
Reducing Liles' Sentence Pursuant To Rule 35
After the district court revoked Liles' probation it executed Liles' underlying

sentence, but reduced that sentence from ten years with two fixed to eight years with
two fixed.

(R., pp.82-85.)

On appeal, Liles argues that the district court abused its

discretion by not sua sponte further reducing his sentence pursuant to Rule 35.
(Appellant's brief, pp.19-22.) Liles has failed to show an abuse of discretion.
Upon revoking probation, the district court may, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule
35, reduce an underlying sentence sua sponte.

I.C.R. 35. A court's decision not to

reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject to the well-established
standards governing whether a sentence is excessive. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho
26, 27, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 978, 783 P.2d
315, 317 (Ct. App. 1989)).

Where a sentence is legal, those standards require an

appellant to establish that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker,
136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831,
11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden, the appellant must show that the sentence is
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at
615.

A sentence is reasonable if appropriate to achieve the primary objective of

protecting society, and any or all of the related sentencing goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation, or retribution.
(1978).

State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730

In deference to the trial judge, the Court will not substitute its view of a

reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho
565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).
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Liles has failed to show that his sentence is excessive. At sentencing, a major
concern for the district court was the protection of society. (See 1/21/2011 Tr., p.37,
Ls.8-25.) Liles' criminal behavior places the community at risk. In the instant offense,
Liles was convicted of felony driving under the influence. (R., pp.44-46.) A review of
his criminal record shows that this was at least the eighth time he had been charged
with driving under the influence. (PSI, pp.3-8.) As the Court has previously said, "[t]he
proverbial drunk driver cuts a wide path of death, pain and grief, as well as untold
physical and emotional injury, across the roads of Idaho and the nation." State v. Puga,
131 Idaho 89, 90, 952 P.2d 904, 905 (Ct. App. 1997).
Liles behavior showed that he was not a good candidate for treatment in the
community.

Initially, the presentence investigator found that Liles "did not appear to

understand the dangers of his actions when choosing to drive while intoxicated." (PSI,
p.16.)

Furthermore, during his interview, Liles "did not admit to having a drinking

problem" and "stated that a treatment program was unnecessary."

(ld.)

Despite

opportunities for treatment and rehabilitation in the retained jurisdiction program and
during his period of probation, Liles continued to consume alcohol. (R., pp.73, 82-85.)
Liles also drove in disregard of the district court's order which suspended his driving
privileges without exception, despite being warned that doing so would be considered a
violation of "a fundamental condition of probation." (Id.)
On appeal, Liles argues that his "history of victimization" and mental health
issues, such as PTSD, are mitigating factors. (Appellant's brief, pp.20-21.) However,
after addressing those mitigating factors, the district court correctly noted that
none of those things justify this recurrent habit of yours to consume too
much alcohol and to drive vehicles. When you do that you become a
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danger to yourself, you become a danger to the community, and you put
innocent people's lives at risk, as you did in this case.
(1/21/2011 Tr., p.36, L.23 - p.37, L.7.)
mitigating factor.

Liles further argues that his alcoholism is a

(Appellant's brief, p.21.) This argument is unavailing. A history of

alcohol abuse is not a mitigating factor in relation to a crime which involves not only the
repeated abuse of alcohol, but driving while abusing alcohol. See State v. Oliver, 144
Idaho 722, 727, 170 P.3d 387, 392 (2007).
Liles has failed to establish an abuse of the district court's sentencing discretion.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Liles' probation in light of Liles'
failure to comply with the terms of that probation. The district court did not abuse its
discretion by not further reducing Liles' sentence upon revoking his probation; Liles'
sentence was reasonable when imposed and remains so in light of his disregard for the
terms of his probation. The district court should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
denying Liles' Rule 35 motion.

DATED this 20th day of November, 2012.

~R

Deputy Attorney General
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